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Effects of carbon emission reduction policies on transportation 
mode selections with stochastic demand 
 
Abstract: We are witnessing more frequent extreme weather events due to the global 
warming. There is an urgent need for governments, industries, general public, and academics 
to take coordinated actions in order to tackle the challenges imposed by the climate change. It 
is essential to incorporate the environmental objective in the transportation mode selection 
problem as transportation is a main contributor to carbon emissions. With this in mind, our 
paper studies the retailer’s ordering and transportation mode selection problem using 
stochastic customer demand and investigates the optimal ordering and transportation mode 
selection decisions under different carbon emission reduction policies. Our analytical results 
reveal that there are some important transportation mode shifting thresholds under different 
carbon emissions reduction policies. These findings do not only help firms to make optimal 
decisions under different carbon emission reduction policies but also support policy makers 
to develop effective policies on carbon emissions reduction. 
Keywords: carbon emission, transportation mode selection, cap-and-trade, supply chain risk 
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1 Introduction  
Over the last few decades, global warming has received an increasing attention as it has led to 
more frequent extreme weather events (Dai 2011; Wheeler and vo Braun 2013; Revesz et al. 
2014). In recent years, we have witnessed more catastrophic incidents such as the 
extraordinary heavy winter storm in the US, the damages brought to the Philippines by the 
strongest ever Typhoon Haiyan, and the draught in some parts of Africa. These incidents do 
not only significantly affect production of many products such as foods but also caused 
severe disruptions in global transportation, on which the global economy is heavily 
dependent. The stability of supply chains may be exposed to risks under climate change since 
it could be affected in several ways ranging from direct effects on production of goods, to 
changes in markets, and supply chain infrastructures. The increase of greenhouse gas (e.g. 
carbon emissions) is regarded as one of the main drivers of global warming (Chen and Hao, 
2015). In response to the challenges due to the climate change, governments and regulators 
have introduced a range of carbon emissions reduction policies including mandatory carbon 
emission capacity, cap, carbon emission tax, and cap-and-trade etc. Consumers have been 
more aware of environmental issues and therefore, are more sensitive towards low carbon 
products (Upham et al. 2011; Vanclay et al. 2011; cohen and Vandenbergh 2012). Many 
companies have also realized the importance of carbon emission reduction and incorporated 
this objective in their operational decisions.  
    As a consequence, a wide range of studies on green supply chain management 
(Srivastava 2007; Sarkis et al. 2011; Gunasekaran et al. 2015), green logistics (Dekker et al. 
2012; Demir et al. 2014), and low carbon manufacturing (Tridech and Cheng 2011) have 
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been reported in the past two decades. It is also well known that the transportation during the 
inbound or outbound logistics contributes a significant portion of carbon emission throughout 
the whole supply chain life cycle (Dekker et al., 2012; Wang et al. 2015b). One of the main 
decisions that companies have to make on transportation is the choice of transportation mode 
as each mode has different characteristics that lead to different economic and environmental 
performance (Meixell and Norbis 2008). There are a few operational research papers that deal 
with this issue (Leal and D’Agosto 2011; Hoen et al. 2014a, b; Konur and Schaefer 2014). 
However, very few studies have examined the effect of incorporating environmental objectives 
in the transportation mode selection and ordering decision on firms’ optimal solutions under 
different carbon reduction policies. Less frequently, researchers have looked at the 
consequence of derived optimal operational decision on the risk level of the logistics and 
supply chain system (Wang et al. 2012). Our research aims to address this gap in the literature 
through investigating the following key questions: 
 What is the impact of different carbon emission reduction policies on the ordering and 
transportation mode selection decisions? 
 How do the optimal operational decisions under different carbon policies affect the 
economic and environmental performance? 
 How does the incorporation of carbon emission reduction objective in the ordering and 
transportation decisions affect the risk of the logistics and supply chain system? 
    To answer these questions, a one-period two-echelon supply chain is considered 
consisting of a supplier and a retailer. The supplier manufactures products with limited shelf 
life. The retailer orders from the supplier and sells to end-users with a stochastic demand. Our 
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analysis aims to obtain the optimal ordering and transportation mode selection decision in 
order to improve both economic and environmental performance. Among many carbon 
emissions reduction policies, the cap policy and the cap-and-trade policy are the policy 
approaches that attract much attention. The cap policy sets an overall cap on carbon 
emissions. In addition to an overall cap, the cap-and-trade policy allows companies to trade 
the unused portion of their cap to other companies with high greenhouse gas emissions. 
Accompanied by complementary regulatory measures, cap-and-trade is a sufficient or 
necessary condition for carbon emissions reduction (Hanemann, 2010). Cap-and-trade policy, 
such as the European Union Emissions Trading Scheme, has been proven to be an important 
tool to address climate change, and becomes a major choice for investors to decentralize their 
investment risks (Zhu and Wei, 2013). In this paper, we examine the impact of two different 
carbon reduction polices: carbon emission cap and cap-and-trade on the retailer’s optimal 
solutions as well as its profit and overall carbon emission. Through a comparison of the 
supply and demand risks under three different scenarios, we intend to understand the effect of 
carbon emission reduction objective and different carbon reduction policies on the risk of the 
logistics and supply chain system.  
    The rest of this paper is organized as follows. After a survey of related literature is 
presented in Section 2, Section 3 describes the model formulation and assumptions. In section 
4, we establish the basic model, in which the optimal ordering and transportation mode 
selection solution is obtained without considering carbon emissions. In Section 5 and 6, we 
investigate the optimal solutions and their impact on profits, carbon emissions and supply 
chain risk under the carbon emission cap policy and the cap-and-trade policy respectively. 
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Finally, we discuss some key research findings in Section 7 and draw the conclusions in 
Section 8.  
 
2 Literature review 
To highlight our contributions, a literature review was conducted and constructed following the 
three key streams: (i) Carbon management in transportation research, (ii) Transportation 
mode selection considering carbon emission, and (iii) Carbon efficient logistics systems with 
risk consideration.  
    With respect to carbon management, transportation is one of the most visible aspects 
that significantly contribute to total emissions of supply chains. As a result, it has attracted 
considerable academic attention, which is reflected in recently published literature reviews on 
the topic. For example, Dekker et al. (2012) provided a comprehensive review of operations 
research on green logistics which integrates environmental aspects in logistics. While an 
overview of green logistics aspects and issues were presented in their review, they also 
concluded that operations research should emphasize its value for the environment and 
develop new models to address the multitude of decisions required to improve the 
environmental performance. Mansouri et al. (2015) provided a systematic review of the 
literature on multi-objective optimisation and decision support for environmental 
sustainability in maritime shipping. The review pointed out that further research is required in 
both theoretical development and applications of multi-objective optimisation based decision 
support systems for sustainable maritime transport. Demir (2014) focused more specifically 
on green road freight transportation and provided a review of recent research on the topic. 
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They extensively surveyed the existing vehicle emission models and analysed the factors 
contributing fuel consumption, which directly relates to the negative environmental 
externalities including carbon emissions. In term of specific models, Bae et al. (2011) 
proposed a two-stage game theoretic model to evaluate the implications of green 
transportation fleets from both policy and organisational perspectives. Many factors such as 
green vehicle technologies, expense of fuel, levels of service differences, and regulatory 
compliance requirements were evaluated in their model. Considering carbon emission 
reduction targets and state subsidy level, Chen et al. (2014) developed a new model for 
coastal liner route design for intermodal networks characterized by competition between 
costal shipping service and trucks. Rodrigues et al. (2015) evaluated possible carbon 
mitigation strategies for UK supply chains by assessing five scenarios that use a different 
combination of alternative ports and multimodal freight transport.  
Transportation mode selection is another research stream (Tsamboulas et al. 2007; 
Meixell and Norbis 2008) that plays an important role in carbon emission reduction in the 
transportation and logistics system as the selection decision makes a significant impact on the 
economic and environmental performance of individual firms and their supply chain as a 
whole. For instance, Noen et al. (2013) found in their case study of a bulk liquids producer 
that carbon emission can be reduced by 10% by switching transport modes with only a 0.7% 
increase in total logistics cost. Among the few studies that incorporate the carbon emission 
reduction objectives in the production and transportation mode selection decision, Bauer et al. 
(2010) incorporated greenhouse gases related costs in intermodal freight transportation 
planning and applied to a rail service network design. Leal and D’Agosto (2011) presented a 
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fieldwork that used the modal choice method to select alternative ways of transporting 
bio-ethanol taking the economic and socio-environmental objectives in consideration. They 
found that long distance road transport appeared to be the worst of the alternative considered 
while local road transport as the best choice to feed long distance pipelines. Bloemhof et al. 
(2011) concluded in their investigation on the environmental impacts of inland navigation 
compared to rail and road transport that road transport remained the largest contributor of 
emissions despite a substantial improvement in emission reduction in recent years. Zhang et al. 
(2013) proposed an optimization model of multimodal network considering the costs of carbon 
emissions and economic scale. They applied the model to the Dutch container terminal 
network configuration and the analysis results showed that the increase in carbon emission 
prices can reduce the total system cost. Konur and Schaefer (2014) incorporated two 
transportation modes: less-than-truckload and truck load into the economic order quantity 
model to examine the impact of different carbon emission reduction polices on retailer’s 
decision. Their finding indicated that regulation parameters have an effect on the retailer’s 
carrier preference.  
The main principle behind the green or carbon efficient logistics is the trade-off between 
transportation costs and emission costs as the environmental objective related factors come 
into the equation (Dekker et al. 2012; Wang et al. 2012; Demir 2014). While increasing 
carbon emission-caused environmental risk is one of the main drivers for green logistics, 
incorporating carbon emission reduction objective into operations decisions has also an 
inverse effect on the level of conventional supply chain risks. Despite its strategic importance, 
very few studies have examined the impact of incorporating a carbon emission reduction 
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objective in the production and transportation decisions on the risks of the logistics and supply 
chain system. Among them, Choi (2013) examined the impacts of carbon footprint tax on 
local sourcing and quick response system in the fashion apparel industry. His research finding 
revealed that the carbon foot print taxation scheme has an effect on the optimal choice of 
sourcing decision. More specifically, a proper design scheme can successfully entice the 
fashion retailer to locally purchase as well as reduce the risk level of the fashion retailer. 
Wang et al. (2012) proposed a risk assessment model of implementing alternative green 
initiatives in the fashion supply chain. They analysed the associated risks of different green 
alternatives subject to different business scenarios. Kengpol et al. (2015) developed a 
decision support framework to assess risk in multimodal green logistics using a combination 
of qualitative and quantitative models. Although their framework enabled to prioritise and 
optimise routes in green logistics, experts’ inputs were also required in order to reach a 
decision.  
Similar to this study, Hoen et al. (2014a) incorporated the network for transport and 
environment method into an inventory model and examined the effect of carbon emission 
regulations on transportation mode selection under stochastic demand. However, their study 
did not incorporate the different carbon emission regulations such carbon tax and emission 
cap in their model. Instead, the authors numerically analysed the effect of different 
regulations on transport mode selection problem. Wang et al. (2015a) examined the effects of 
carbon emission taxes on transportation mode selection decision and social welfare. Their 
research mainly focused on the effects of carbon emission taxes but not the cap and 
cap-and-trade policies. Different to above mentioned studies, considering both environmental 
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and financial objectives, our research integrates the transportation mode selection into a 
retailer ordering decision with stochastic customer demand. We analyse the effect of different 
carbon emission reduction policies including emission cap and cap-and-trade on the retailer’s 
optimal ordering and transportation mode selection decision. Furthermore, in addition to the 
evaluation of the impact of different carbon emission reduction policies on retailer’s financial 
and environmental performance, we also discuss the implications of these decisions on the 
supply chain risks. The research will provide important managerial and policy implications 
that support firms making important operational and strategic decisions to improve their 
financial performances and help governments develop effective carbon emission reduction 
polices to meet their environmental targets without compromising the sustainable 
development of the economy. 
 
3 Model descriptions and assumption 
We consider a one-period two-echelon supply chain consisting of a supplier who 
manufactures short shelf-life products and a retailer who orders from the supplier and sells to 
end-users with stochastic demand. Before the beginning of the selling season, the retailer 
receives an initial allocation of emission allowance from the government. The retailer can 
also buy additional allowance from or sell them to the outside market. Then the retailer places 
an order and transports the products from the supplier to the retailer. There are two 
transportation modes for the retailer to choose: the first one has low unit transportation cost 
and high unit carbon emissions, and the other has high unit transportation cost and low unit 
carbon emissions. At the beginning of selling season, the retailer obtains the products and 
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then sells to the customers during the selling season. After the selling season, the excessive 
product can be salvaged, and the retailer should not discharge more emissions than the 
allowance they hold. So, the retailer should decide the order quantity, transportation mode 
selection and carbon emission trading quantity before the customers’ demands are arrived so 
as to achieve his maximum expected profit. 
Throughout this paper, we use the parameters and variables as the following notations in 
Table 1. 
Table. 1 Notations 
Notation Descriptions 
𝐷 The stochastic market demand. 
𝑓(𝑥) Probability density function for the stochastic market demand. 
𝐹(𝑥) 
Distribution function for the stochastic market demand, which is differentiable, 
invertible and strictly increasing.  
𝑝 Unit retail price of product. 
𝑤 Unit wholesale price of product. 
𝑣 Units salvage value of product. 
𝑔 Retailer’s unit penalty cost for demand that cannot be filled 
𝑞 Retailer’s order quantity. 
𝐾 Initial carbon emission allowance from government. 
𝑘0 Unit carbon emission during retail period 
𝑘1 and 𝑘2 Unit carbon emission of transportation mode 1 and transportation mode 2 
respectively. 
𝑐1 and 𝑐2 Unit transportation cost of transportation mode 1 and transportation mode 2 
respectively. 
𝑒 Unit price of carbon emission trading with the outside market. 
𝐸 Carbon emission trading quantities with the outside market. 
𝜃 The ratio of retailer adopting transportation mode 1, 0 ≤ 𝜃 ≤ 1. 
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In addition, we assume that the parameters satisfy the following conditions: 
(1) 𝑐1 < 𝑐2 and 𝑘1 > 𝑘2. This condition means that the transportation mode 1 has 
lower unit transportation cost and higher unit transportation carbon emissions than these of 
the transportation mode 2. 
(2) 𝑝 > 𝑤 + 𝑐2 > 𝑠 > 0. This condition states there is a positive profit margin for 
retailer to sell a product to the consumer market. On the other hand, the salvage value is less 
than the order and transportation costs, which implies that there is a loss if a product is not 
sold.  
 
4 The basic model 
We firstly consider the basic model without carbon emissions policy. The unit transportation 
cost is 𝜃𝑐1 + (1 − 𝜃 )𝑐2 = 𝑐2 − 𝜃(𝑐2 − 𝑐1). The retailer’s profit, denoted 𝜋𝑛(𝑞, 𝜃), is 
𝜋𝑛(𝑞, 𝜃) = 𝑝𝑚𝑖𝑛(𝑞, 𝐷) + 𝑣(𝑞 − 𝐷)
+ − 𝑔(𝐷 − 𝑞 )+ − 𝑤𝑞 − [𝑐2 − 𝜃(𝑐2 − 𝑐1)]𝑞 (1) 
The first term is retail revenue, the second term is the salvage value, and the last three 
terms represent the shortage cost, purchase cost and transportation cost respectively. 
The retailer’s expected profit without carbon emissions policy, denoted 𝐸[𝜋𝑛(𝑞, 𝜃)], is 
𝐸[𝜋𝑛(𝑞, 𝜃)] = [𝑝 + 𝑔 − 𝑤 − 𝑐2 + 𝜃(𝑐2 − 𝑐1)]𝑞 − (𝑝 + 𝑔 − 𝑣) ∫ 𝐹(𝑥)
𝑞
0
𝑑𝑥 −
𝑔 ∫ 𝑥𝑓(𝑥)
+∞
0
𝑑𝑥 (2) 
As to the optimal ratio of retailer adopting transportation mode 1 (𝜃𝑛) and optimal order 
quantity (𝑞𝑛) in the basic model without carbon emissions policy, the following proposition is 
obtained. 
Proposition 1: Without carbon emissions policy, 𝜽𝒏 = 𝟏 and 𝒒𝒏 = 𝑭−𝟏 (
𝒑+𝒈−𝒘−𝒄𝟏
𝒑+𝒈−𝒗
). 
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This proposition means that in the basic model without carbon emissions policy, the 
retailer will select the transportation mode only according to the unit transportation cost, and 
prefer to choose transportation mode 1 and will gain more profit. Without carbon emissions 
policy, the risk faced by retailer is only from the uncertain nature of stochastic demand. The 
retailer’s optimal quantity is a decreasing function of unit retail price of product, unit 
wholesale price of product, retailer’s unit penalty cost for demand that cannot be filled, and 
unit transportation cost of transportation mode 1, and is an increasing function of units 
salvage value of product. 
  
5 The cap model 
In the cap model, the government sets a cap (𝐾) on the quantity of pollution that the retailer 
can emit in a given period. The unit carbon emission of mixed transportation modes is 𝜃𝑘1 +
(1 − 𝜃 )𝑘2 = 𝑘2 + 𝜃(𝑘1 − 𝑘2). The decision problem faced by the retailer is to decide the 
optimal transportation mode and optimal ordering quantity and so as to maximize his profit 
𝐸[𝜋𝑛(𝑞, 𝜃)], subject to the carbon emission constraint being satisfied. The decision problem 
faced by the retailer is 
max
𝑞,𝜃
𝐸[𝜋𝑛(𝑞, 𝜃)] 
s.t [𝑘0 + 𝑘2 + 𝜃(𝑘1 − 𝑘2)]𝑞 ≤ 𝐾 (3) 
5.1 The optimal transportation mode selection and ordering policies 
Set 𝐾1 = (𝑘0 + 𝑘2)𝑞
∗ and 𝐾2 = (𝑘0 + 𝑘1)𝑞
𝑛. As to the optimal ratio of retailer adopting 
transportation mode 1 (𝜃𝑐) and retailer’s optimal order quantity (𝑞𝑐) in the cap model, the 
following proposition is obtained. 
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Proposition 2: In the cap model, if 𝑲 ≥ 𝑲𝟐, then 𝜽
𝒄 = 𝟏 and 𝒒𝒄 = 𝒒𝒏; if 𝑲𝟏 < 𝑲 < 𝑲𝟐, 
then 𝜽𝒄 =
𝑲−(𝒌𝟎+𝒌𝟐)𝒒
∗
(𝒌𝟏−𝒌𝟐)𝒒∗
 and 𝒒𝒄 = 𝒒∗ ; if 𝑲 ≤ 𝑲𝟏 , then 𝜽
𝒄 = 𝟎  and 𝒒𝒄 =
𝑲
𝒌𝟎+𝒌𝟐
, where 
𝒒∗ = 𝑭−𝟏 [
𝒑+𝒈−𝒘−
𝒄𝟐(𝒌𝟎+𝒌𝟏)−𝒄𝟏(𝒌𝟎+𝒌𝟐)
𝒌𝟏−𝒌𝟐
𝒑+𝒈−𝒗
]. 
This proposition indicates that with the cap policy, the retailer’s optimal transportation 
mode selection decision and optimal order quantity are existence and unique. This 
proposition also indicates there are two important transportation mode shifting thresholds: 
𝐾1 and 𝐾2.  𝐾1 means the retailer’s total carbon emissions with transportation mode 2 and 
𝐾2 means the retailer’s total carbon emissions with transportation mode 1.  
According to the value of the government’s initial carbon emission quota (𝐾), there are 
three intervals as illustrated in Figure 1. The first interval is that the government’s initial 
carbon emission quota is higher than the transportation mode shifting threshold, (𝐾2). In this 
interval, the carbon emissions quota is not binding, then the retailer will choose a cheaper and 
dirtier mode (transportation mode 1), and the retailer’s optimal order quantity is fixed. The 
second interval is that the government’s initial carbon emission quota is less than the 
transportation mode shifting threshold 𝐾2 and higher than the transportation mode shifting 
threshold 𝐾1. In this interval, the carbon emissions quota is binding. Then the retailer would 
like to reduce the order quantity and choose mixed transportation modes to meet the carbon 
emissions quota binding. The retailer’s order quantity is fixed. Part of the order is translated 
by the cheaper and dirtier mode (transportation mode 1) and the rest part of the order is 
switched to the more expensive and less polluting mode (transportation mode 2). The optimal 
ratio of retailer adopting transportation mode 1 (𝜃𝑐 ) is an increasing function of the 
government’s initial carbon emission quota. That is, with the decreasing of the government’s 
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initial carbon emission quota, the optimal ratio of retailer adopting transportation mode 1 is 
decreasing and the optimal ratio of retailer adopting transportation mode is increasing. The 
third interval is that the government’s initial carbon emission quota is less than the 
transportation mode shifting threshold 𝐾1. In this interval, the government’s initial carbon 
emission quota is very low, then switching to more expensive and less polluting mode 
(transportation mode 2) is preferred. The retailer’s optimal order quantity is an increasing 
function of the government’s initial carbon emission quota. That is, with the decreasing of the 
government’s initial carbon emission quota, the retailer’s optimal order quantity is 
decreasing. 
 
From the view of the government or policy maker, with the cap policy, the retailer can 
be motivated to adopt less polluting transportation mode and order reasonable product 
quantity through adjusting the government’s initial carbon emission quota. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0 
 1  2   
   
1 
 ∗ 
   
   
Figure 1. Optimal transportation mode selection and ordering policies with cap 
policy 
Optimal ordering policy with cap policy 
Optimal transportation mode selection policy with cap policy 
15 
 
5.2 The effect of the cap policy 
Below we discuss the effect of the cap policy on the retailer’s optimal ordering quantity and 
maximum expected profit. As to the effect of the cap policy on the retailer’s optimal ordering 
quantity, the following proposition is obtained. 
Proposition 3: If 𝑲 ≥ (𝒌𝟎 + 𝒌𝟏)𝒒
𝒏, then 𝒒𝒄 = 𝒒𝒏; if 𝑲 < (𝒌𝟎 + 𝒌𝟏)𝒒
𝒏, then 𝒒𝒄 < 𝒒𝒏. 
    This proposition shows that if the government’s initial carbon emission quota (𝐾) is high 
and not binding, then the retailer’s optimal ordering quantity (𝑞𝑐) is equal to that without 
considering carbon emissions (𝑞𝑛). If the government’s initial carbon emission quota (𝐾) is 
low and binding, then the retailer’s optimal ordering quantity (𝑞𝑐) is less than that without 
considering carbon emissions (𝑞𝑛). That is, the retailer optimizes the transportation mode 
selection decision and orders less number of products to reduce the total carbon emissions 
and environment risk, but will face increased understock risk caused by the uncertain nature 
of stochastic demand and less order quantity at the same time. 
As to the effect of the cap policy on retailer’s maximum expected profit, the following 
proposition is obtained. 
Proposition 4: If 𝑲 ≥ (𝒌𝟎 + 𝒌𝟏)𝒒
𝒏 , then 𝑬[𝝅𝒏(𝒒
𝒄, 𝜽𝒄)] = 𝑬[𝝅𝒏(𝒒
𝒏, 𝜽𝒏)] ; if 𝑲 <
(𝒌𝟎 + 𝒌𝟏)𝒒
𝒏, then 𝑬[𝝅𝒏(𝒒
𝒄, 𝜽𝒄)] < 𝑬[𝝅𝒏(𝒒
𝒏, 𝜽𝒏)]. 
    This proposition means that if the government’s initial carbon emission quota (𝐾) is 
high and not binding, then the retailer’s maximum expected profit with the cap policy 
(𝐸[𝜋𝑛(𝑞
𝑐, 𝜃𝑐)]) is equal to that without considering carbon emissions (𝐸[𝜋𝑛(𝑞
𝑛, 𝜃𝑛)]). If the 
government’s initial carbon emission quota (𝐾) is low and binding, then the retailer’s 
maximum expected profit with the cap policy is less than that without considering carbon 
16 
 
emissions. In a word, the retailer’s maximum expected profit with the cap policy is less than 
or equal to that without considering carbon emissions. So, from the retailer’s point of view, 
he would not voluntarily reduce the amount of carbon emissions up to a certain level without 
considering a carbon cap regulatory policy. 
 
6 The cap-and-trade model 
In this section, we discuss the cap-and-trade model. With the cap-and-trade policy, if the 
retailer does not use up its entire cap, it can sell its remaining quota to the outside market. If 
the retailer needs additional quota, it can purchase the shortage quota from the outside market. 
The decision problem faced by the retailer is to decide the optimal transportation mode 
selection, ordering and carbon emission trading policies. The retailer’s decision making 
model is 
max
𝑞,𝜃
𝐸[𝜋𝑒(𝑞, 𝜃)] = max
𝑞,𝜃
[𝐸[𝜋𝑛(𝑞, 𝜃)] − 𝑒𝐸] 
s.t [𝑘0 + 𝑘2 + 𝜃(𝑘1 − 𝑘2)]𝑞 = 𝐾 + 𝐸 (4) 
This constraint means that the retailer’s total carbon emission is equal to the sum of 
initial carbon emission cap set by the government and the trading quantity of carbon emission 
with the outside market. When 𝐸 > 0, it means that the retailer will buy carbon emission 
quota from the outside market. When 𝐸 = 0, it means that the retailer will not trade with the 
outside market. When 𝐸 < 0, it means that the retailer will sell carbon emission quota to the 
outside market. 
6.1 The optimal transportation mode selection, ordering and carbon emission trading 
policies 
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As to the optimal ratio of retailer adopting transportation mode 1 (𝜃𝑒), the retailer’s optimal 
order quantity (𝑞𝑒) and optimal carbon emission trading policy (𝐸𝑒) in the cap-and-trade 
model, the following proposition is obtained. 
Proposition 5: With cap-and-trade policy, if 𝒆 >
𝒄𝟐−𝒄𝟏
𝒌𝟏−𝒌𝟐
, then 𝜽𝒆 = 𝟎 , 𝒒𝒆 =
𝑭−𝟏 [
𝒑+𝒈−𝒘−𝒄𝟐−𝒆(𝒌𝟎+𝒌𝟐)
𝒑+𝒈−𝒗
] and 𝑬𝒆 = (𝒌𝟎 + 𝒌𝟐)𝒒
𝒆 − 𝑲; if 𝒆 <
𝒄𝟐−𝒄𝟏
𝒌𝟏−𝒌𝟐
, then 𝜽𝒆 = 𝟏 , 𝒒𝒆 =
𝑭−𝟏 [
𝒑+𝒈−𝒘−𝒄𝟏−𝒆(𝒌𝟎+𝒌𝟏)
𝒑+𝒈−𝒗
] and 𝑬𝒆 = (𝒌𝟎 + 𝒌𝟏)𝒒
𝒆 − 𝑲.  
This proposition means that with the cap-and-trade policy, the retailer’s optimal 
transportation mode selection policy, optimal order quantity and optimal carbon emission 
trading policy are existence and unique. From this proposition, we also know that the 
threshold 
𝑐2−𝑐1
𝑘1−𝑘2
 is important. Set 𝑒0 =
𝑐2−𝑐1
𝑘1−𝑘2
. 𝑒0  represents the transportation mode 
shifting threshold under the cap-and-trade policy. 𝑒0 is decided by the unit carbon emission 
and unit transportation cost of two transportation modes, but it has no relationship with the 
initial government carbon emissions quota.  
According to the unit price of carbon emission trading with the outside market (𝑒), there 
are two intervals. The first interval is that the unit price of carbon emission trading with the 
outside market is higher than the transportation mode shifting threshold (𝑒0). In this interval, 
the increased unit carbon emissions cost caused by using transportation mode 1 is higher than 
the decreased unit transportation cost, then the retailer will prefer the more expensive and less 
polluting mode (transportation mode 2). The retailer’s optimal order quantity is fixed. The 
second interval is that the unit price of carbon emission trading with the outside market is 
lower than the transportation mode shifting threshold (𝑒0). In this interval, the increased unit 
carbon emissions cost caused by using transportation mode 1 is lower than the decreased unit 
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transportation cost, then switching to the cheaper and dirtier mode (transportation mode 1) is 
preferred. The retailer’s optimal order quantity is also fixed. If the unit price of carbon 
emission trading with the outside market (𝑒) is equal to the transportation mode shifting 
threshold (𝑒0), that is, the increased unit carbon emissions cost caused by using transportation 
mode 1 is equal to the decreased unit transportation cost, then the two transportation modes 
are equal. 
From the view of the government or policy maker, with the cap-and-trade policy, the 
retailer can be encouraged to adopt less polluting transportation mode and order reasonable 
product through adjusting the unit price of carbon emission trading with the outside market. 
6.2 The effect of the cap-and-trade policy 
Now we discuss the effect of the cap-and-trade policy on the retailer’s optimal ordering 
quantity, total carbon emissions, and maximum expected profit.  
Denote the unit transportation carbon emissions with the cap-and-trade policy is 𝑘𝑒. 
From proposition 5, we get that if 𝑒 >
𝑐2−𝑐1
𝑘1−𝑘2
, then 𝑘𝑒 = 𝑘2; if 𝑒 <
𝑐2−𝑐1
𝑘1−𝑘2
, then 𝑘𝑒 = 𝑘1. As 
to the effect of the cap-and-trade policy on the retailer’s optimal ordering quantity and total 
carbon emissions, the following proposition is obtained. 
Proposition 6: 𝒒𝒆 < 𝒒𝒏 and (𝒌𝟎 + 𝒌𝒆)𝒒
𝒆 < (𝒌𝟎 + 𝒌𝟏)𝒒
𝒏. 
    This proposition indicates that the retailer’s optimal ordering quantity with the 
cap-and-trade policy is less than that without considering carbon emissions, and the retailer’s 
total carbon emissions with the cap-and-trade policy is less than that without considering 
carbon emissions. That is, with the cap-and-trade policy, the retailer takes the environment 
risk into consideration and reduces the total carbon emissions through transportation mode 
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selection and less order quantity, but the understock risk caused by uncertain demand is 
increased with less order quantity. 
As to the effect of cap-and-trade policy on the retailer’s maximum expected profit, the 
following proposition is obtained. 
Proposition 7: If 𝑲 > 𝑲∗ , then 𝑬[𝝅𝒆(𝒒
𝒆, 𝜽𝒆)] > 𝑬[𝝅𝒏(𝒒
𝒏, 𝜽𝒏)] ; if 𝑲 = 𝑲∗ , then 
𝑬[𝝅𝒆(𝒒
𝒆, 𝜽𝒆)] = 𝑬[𝝅𝒏(𝒒
𝒏, 𝜽𝒏)]; if 𝑲 < 𝑲∗ , then 𝑬[𝝅𝒆(𝒒
𝒆, 𝜽𝒆)] < 𝑬[𝝅𝒏(𝒒
𝒏, 𝜽𝒏)], where 
𝑲∗ = [𝒌𝟎 + 𝒌𝟐 + 𝜽
𝒆(𝒌𝟏 − 𝒌𝟐)]𝒒
𝒆 +
𝟏
𝒆
{𝑬[𝝅𝒏(𝒒
𝒏, 𝜽𝒏)] − 𝑬[𝝅𝒏(𝒒
𝒆, 𝜽𝒆)]}. 
This proposition means that the retailer’s optimal profit with the cap-and-trade policy 
can be higher than, equal to, or less than that without considering carbon emissions. It all 
depends on the government’s initial carbon emission quota. That is, if the government’s 
initial carbon emission quota is high, then the retailer’s optimal profit with the cap-and-trade 
policy is higher than that without considering carbon emissions. If the government’s initial 
carbon emission quota is medium, then the retailer’s optimal profit with cap-and-trade policy 
is equal to that without considering carbon emissions. If the government’s initial carbon 
emission quota is low, then the retailer’s optimal profit with the cap-and-trade policy is less 
than that without considering carbon emissions. 
 
7 Discussions  
In this section, we summarize the key findings of the research and discuss the insights and 
implications of our findings. First, our analytical results reveal that there are two important 
transportation mode shifting thresholds under the emission cap policy. If the government’s 
initial carbon emission quota is more than the first threshold, 𝐾1 = (𝑘0 + 𝑘1)𝑞
𝑛, the retailer 
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will choose the cheaper transportation mode with high carbon emission. If the quota is less 
than the second threshold, 𝐾2 = (𝑘0 + 𝑘2)𝑞
∗, companies will choose the more expensive 
transportation mode with low carbon emissions. More interestingly, if the quota is within the 
interval between the two thresholds, the retailer will select a mixed transportation mode and 
the distribution between the two modes is dependent on the initial quota.  
For the cap-and-trade policy, there is also an important transportation mode shifting 
threshold, which depends on the unit carbon emissions and the unit transportation costs of 
two transportation modes. Different to the cap policy, the initial government carbon 
emissions quota has no effect on this threshold under the cap-and-trade policy. If the unit 
price of carbon emission trading with the outside market is higher than the threshold, the 
retailer will select the more expensive transportation mode with low carbon emissions. In 
contrast, if the unit price of carbon emission trading is lower than the threshold, the retailer 
will switch to a cheaper mode with high carbon emissions. The two transportation modes 
make no difference if the threshold is equal to the unit price of carbon emission trading.  
The above two findings provide some important insights, which do not only help firms 
to make optimal decisions to improve their economic performance under different carbon 
emission reduction policies but also support government policy making on carbon emission 
reduction. For instance, they can decide a lower initial carbon emission quota under the cap 
policy to encourage firms to choose more carbon efficient transportation mode in order to 
meet carbon emission reduction targets. Under the cap-and-trade policy, instead of setting up 
a lower initial carbon emission quota, a more effective option to meet the carbon emission 
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reduction target is to increase the unit price of carbon emission trading with the outside 
market.     
Our findings also indicate that incorporating the carbon emission reduction objective in 
the ordering and transportation mode selection decision will help to reduce the environmental 
risk under different carbon emission reduction policies. However, it will have a knock-on 
effect on supply chain risks. For instance, under both the cap policy and the cap-and-trade 
policy, it will increase the understock risk because a retailer intends to order lower quantity of 
product to reduce the carbon emission cost while facing uncertain demand. Firms may have 
to consider the trade-off between the additional cost incurred by the increased supply chain 
risk and the financial benefit of reduced carbon emission when making such decisions.   
 
8 Conclusions and future research 
Taking both the financial and environmental objectives into consideration, this paper studies 
the retailer’s ordering and transportation mode selection problem using stochastic customer 
demand. We obtained the optimal ordering and mode selection decision under different 
carbon emission reduction policies. By comparing the optimal solutions and performances 
under different policies to the basic model in which only financial cost is considered, we 
evaluate the impact of different policies on retailer’s financial and environmental 
performance and discuss the risk implications of these decisions on the supply chain. 
   This research makes several key contributions. First, theoretically, our research is one of 
few studies that have examined the effect of different carbon emissions reduction policies on 
firms’ ordering and transportation mode selection problem considering both economic and 
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environmental objectives. Furthermore, we discuss the implications of derived optimal 
solutions on the logistics and supply chain risks. Second, our research findings provide 
interesting managerial insights that will support firms making important operational and 
strategic decisions in order to improve their financial and environmental performances. For 
instance, firms can derive the optimal ordering quantity and select the correct transportation 
mode under different carbon emission policies. Our findings will give firms a better 
understanding of the supply and demand risks imposed by these ordering and transportation 
mode selection decisions, and therefore, take more proactive actions to mitigate supply chain 
risks. Finally, our research findings also have some important policy implications that 
governments can use to develop effect carbon emission reduction polices in order to meet their 
overall carbon emission reduction targets without compromising the sustainable development 
of the economy.   
    Similar to many other previous studies, this research has some limitations which open 
avenues for future research. For example, this paper only considers one retailer’s ordering 
and transportation mode selection problem. It can be extended by considering the 
transportation mode selection of both inbound and outbound logistics and, alternatively, 
incorporating supplier’s inventory control decision in the model. Moreover, the stochastic 
demand function used in the paper does not consider the competition between rival 
competitors. One interesting research extension is to incorporate horizontal competition in the 
demand function. In addition to the cost and carbon emission considered in this research, 
transportation mode selection decisions are also influenced many other factors such as lead 
time (Kiesmüller et al. 2005), fuel consumption (Demir et al. 2014), supply chain power 
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structure (Chen et al. 2015; Chen and Wang 2015), and social welfare (Wang et al. 2015a). It 
will be useful but a more challenging research if these factors are considered. While some of 
the factors can be incorporated in the modelling, others may not be realistically modelled. 
More importantly, we also recognize the value of examining actual responses from 
organisations to carbon quotas. One future research extension is to seek to ascertain how 
organisations actually respond to these situations and to unearth other variables that include 
the decision making processes.  
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Appendix 
The proof of proposition 1 
From (2), we get 
𝜕𝐸[𝜋𝑛(𝑞,𝜃)]
𝜕𝜃
= (𝑐2 − 𝑐1)𝑞 > 0, that is, 𝐸[𝜋𝑛(𝑞, 𝜃)] is an increasing function 
of 𝜃. Recalling 0 ≤ 𝜃 ≤ 1, 𝜃𝑛 = 1.  
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Replace 𝜃𝑛 to (2), we get 𝐸[𝜋𝑛(𝑞, 𝜃
𝑛)] = (𝑝 + 𝑔 − 𝑤 − 𝑐1)𝑞 − (𝑝 + 𝑔 − 𝑣) ∫ 𝐹(𝑥)
𝑞
0
𝑑𝑥 −
𝑔 ∫ 𝑥𝑓(𝑥)
+∞
0
𝑑𝑥 . Then, 
𝑑𝐸[𝜋𝑛(𝑞,𝜃
𝑛)]
𝑑𝑞
= (𝑝 + 𝑔 − 𝑤 − 𝑐1) − (𝑝 + 𝑔 − 𝑣)𝐹(𝑞)  and 
𝑑2𝐸[𝜋𝑛(𝑞,𝜃
𝑛)]
𝑑𝑞2
= −(𝑝 + 𝑔 − 𝑣)𝑓(𝑞) < 0, that is, 𝐸[𝜋𝑛(𝑞, 𝜃
𝑛)] is a concave function of 𝑞. 
Let 
𝑑𝐸[𝜋𝑛(𝑞,𝜃
𝑛)]
𝑑𝑞
= 0, we get 𝑞𝑛 = 𝐹−1 (
𝑝+𝑔−𝑤−𝑐1
𝑝+𝑔−𝑣
).  
So, without carbon emissions policy, 𝜃𝑛 = 1 and 𝑞𝑛 = 𝐹−1 (
𝑝+𝑔−𝑤−𝑐1
𝑝+𝑔−𝑣
). This completes 
the proof. 
 
The proof of proposition 2 
From proposition 1, we get [𝑘0 + 𝑘2 + 𝜃
𝑛(𝑘1 − 𝑘2)]𝑞
𝑛 = (𝑘0 + 𝑘1)𝑞
𝑛. 
(1) If 𝐾 ≥ (𝑘0 + 𝑘1)𝑞
𝑛, that is, the cap is satisfied automatically and the cap is not binding. 
Then, 𝑞𝑐 = 𝑞𝑛 = 𝐹−1 (
𝑝+𝑔−𝑤−𝑐1
𝑝+𝑔−𝑣
) and 𝜃𝑐 = 𝜃𝑛 = 1. 
(2) If 𝐾 < (𝑘0 + 𝑘1)𝑞
𝑛, that is, the cap is not binding. According to the KKT condition, the 
optimal solution satisfies the following conditions: 
𝜆1{[𝑘0 + 𝑘2 + 𝜃(𝑘1 − 𝑘2)]𝑞 − 𝐾} = 0 
−𝜆2𝑞 = 0 
−𝜆3𝜃 = 0 
𝑝 + 𝑔 − 𝑤 − 𝑐2 + 𝜃(𝑐2 − 𝑐1) − (𝑝 + 𝑔 − 𝑣)𝐹(𝑞) − 𝜆1[𝑘0 + 𝑘2 + 𝜃(𝑘1 − 𝑘2)] + 𝜆2 = 0 
(𝑐2 − 𝑐1)𝑞 − 𝜆1(𝑘1 − 𝑘2)𝑞 + 𝜆3 = 0 
𝜆1 ≥ 0, 𝜆2 ≥ 0, 𝜆3 ≥ 0 
Then，if 𝐾 > (𝑘0 + 𝑘2)𝑞
∗, then 𝜃𝑐 =
𝐾−(𝑘0+𝑘2)𝑞
∗
(𝑘1−𝑘2)𝑞∗
 and 𝑞𝑐 = 𝑞∗; if 𝐾 ≤ (𝑘0 + 𝑘2)𝑞
∗, then 
𝜃𝑐 = 0 and 𝑞𝑐 =
𝐾
𝑘0+𝑘2
, where 𝑞∗ = 𝐹−1 [
𝑝+𝑔−𝑤−
𝑐2(𝑘0+𝑘1)−𝑐1(𝑘0+𝑘2)
𝑘1−𝑘2
𝑝+𝑔−𝑣
]. 
So, in the cap model, if 𝐾 ≥ (𝑘0 + 𝑘1)𝑞
𝑛, then 𝜃𝑐 = 1 and 𝑞𝑐 = 𝑞𝑛; if (𝑘0 + 𝑘2)𝑞
∗ <
𝐾 < (𝑘0 + 𝑘1)𝑞
𝑛, then 𝜃𝑐 =
𝐾−(𝑘0+𝑘2)𝑞
∗
(𝑘1−𝑘2)𝑞∗
 and 𝑞𝑐 = 𝑞∗; if 𝐾 ≤ (𝑘0 + 𝑘2)𝑞
∗, then 𝜃𝑐 = 0 
and 𝑞𝑐 =
𝐾
𝑘0+𝑘2
, where 𝑞∗ = 𝐹−1 [
𝑝+𝑔−𝑤−
𝑐2(𝑘0+𝑘1)−𝑐1(𝑘0+𝑘2)
𝑘1−𝑘2
𝑝+𝑔−𝑣
]. This completes the proof. 
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The proof of proposition 3 
From proposition 2, we get that if 𝐾 ≥ (𝑘0 + 𝑘1)𝑞
𝑛, then 𝑞𝑐 = 𝑞𝑛. 
Recalling 𝑐1 < 𝑐2 and 𝑘1 > 𝑘2, then 𝑐1 −
𝑐2(𝑘0+𝑘1)−𝑐1(𝑘0+𝑘2)
𝑘1−𝑘2
=
(𝑐1−𝑐2)(𝑘0+𝑘1)
𝑘1−𝑘2
< 0, that is, 
𝑐1 <
𝑐2(𝑘0+𝑘1)−𝑐1(𝑘0+𝑘2)
𝑘1−𝑘2
. So from proposition 1 and proposition 2, we get 𝑞𝑐 = 𝑞∗ =
𝐹−1 [
𝑝+𝑔−𝑤−
𝑐2(𝑘0+𝑘1)−𝑐1(𝑘0+𝑘2)
𝑘1−𝑘2
𝑝+𝑔−𝑣
] < 𝐹−1 (
𝑝+𝑔−𝑤−𝑐1
𝑝+𝑔−𝑣
) = 𝑞𝑛 , that is, if (𝑘0 + 𝑘2)𝑞
∗ < 𝐾 <
(𝑘0 + 𝑘1)𝑞
𝑛, then, 𝑞𝑐 < 𝑞𝑛. 
If 𝐾 ≤ (𝑘0 + 𝑘2)𝑞
∗, from proposition 2, we get 𝑞𝑐 =
𝐾
𝑘0+𝑘2
< 𝑞∗ < 𝑞𝑛, that is, 𝑞𝑐 < 𝑞𝑛. 
Hence, if 𝐾 ≥ (𝑘0 + 𝑘1)𝑞
𝑛 , then 𝑞𝑐 = 𝑞𝑛 ; if 𝐾 < (𝑘0 + 𝑘1)𝑞
𝑛 , then 𝑞𝑐 < 𝑞𝑛 . This 
completes the proof. 
 
The proof of proposition 4 
From proposition 2, if 𝐾 ≥ (𝑘0 + 𝑘1)𝑞
𝑛 , then 𝜃𝑐 = 𝜃𝑛 = 1  and 𝑞𝑐 = 𝑞𝑛 , so 
𝐸[𝜋𝑛(𝑞
𝑐, 𝜃𝑐)] = 𝐸[𝜋𝑛(𝑞
𝑛, 𝜃𝑛)]. 
From proposition 1 and proposition 2, if 𝐾 < (𝑘0 + 𝑘1)𝑞
𝑛, then 𝜃𝑐 < 𝜃𝑛 and 𝑞𝑐 < 𝑞𝑛. 
Considering the maximum of 𝐸[𝜋𝑛(𝑞, 𝜃)], we get 𝐸[𝜋𝑛(𝑞
𝑐, 𝜃𝑐)] < 𝐸[𝜋𝑛(𝑞
𝑛, 𝜃𝑛)]. 
So, if 𝐾 ≥ (𝑘0 + 𝑘1)𝑞
𝑛, then 𝐸[𝜋𝑛(𝑞
𝑐, 𝜃𝑐)] = 𝐸[𝜋𝑛(𝑞
𝑛, 𝜃𝑛)]; if 𝐾 < (𝑘0 + 𝑘1)𝑞
𝑛 , then 
𝐸[𝜋𝑛(𝑞
𝑐, 𝜃𝑐)] < 𝐸[𝜋𝑛(𝑞
𝑛, 𝜃𝑛)]. This completes the proof. 
 
The proof of proposition 5 
From (4), we get 𝐸 = [𝑘0 + 𝑘2 + 𝜃(𝑘1 − 𝑘2)]𝑞 − 𝐾 , then 𝐸[𝜋𝑒(𝑞, 𝜃)] = 𝐸[𝜋𝑛(𝑞, 𝜃)] −
𝑒{[𝑘0 + 𝑘2 + 𝜃(𝑘1 − 𝑘2)]𝑞 − 𝐾}. Then, we get 
𝜕𝐸[𝜋𝑒(𝑞,𝜃)]
𝜕𝜃
= (𝑐2 − 𝑐1)𝑞 − 𝑒(𝑘1 − 𝑘2)𝑞 =
[(𝑐2 − 𝑐1) − 𝑒(𝑘1 − 𝑘2)]𝑞. 
If 𝑒 >
𝑐2−𝑐1
𝑘1−𝑘2
, then 
𝜕𝐸[𝜋𝑒(𝑞,𝜃)]
𝜕𝜃
< 0, that is, 𝐸[𝜋𝑒(𝑞, 𝜃)] is a decreasing function of 𝜃, then 
𝜃𝑒 = 0; if 𝑒 =
𝑐2−𝑐1
𝑘1−𝑘2
, then 
𝜕𝐸[𝜋𝑒(𝑞,𝜃)]
𝜕𝜃
= 0, that is, 𝐸[𝜋𝑒(𝑞, 𝜃)] has no relationship with 𝜃; 
if 𝑒 <
𝑐2−𝑐1
𝑘1−𝑘2
, then 
𝜕𝐸[𝜋𝑒(𝑞,𝜃)]
𝜕𝜃
> 0, that is, 𝐸[𝜋𝑒(𝑞, 𝜃)] is an increasing function of 𝜃, then 
𝜃𝑒 = 1. 
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For a given 𝜃 , 
𝑑𝐸[𝜋𝑒(𝑞,𝜃)]
𝑑𝑞
= 𝑝 + 𝑔 − 𝑤 − 𝑐2 + 𝜃(𝑐2 − 𝑐1) − (𝑝 + 𝑔 − 𝑣)𝐹(𝑞) − 𝑒[𝑘0 +
𝑘2 + 𝜃(𝑘1 − 𝑘2)]  and 
𝑑2𝐸[𝜋𝑒(𝑞,𝜃)]
𝑑𝑞2
= −(𝑝 + 𝑔 − 𝑣)𝑓(𝑞) < 0 , that is, 𝐸[𝜋𝑒(𝑞, 𝜃)]  is a 
concave function of 𝑞 . Let 
𝑑𝐸[𝜋𝑒(𝑞,𝜃)]
𝑑𝑞
= 0 , we get 𝑞𝑒 =
𝐹−1 {
𝑝+𝑔−𝑤−𝑐2+𝜃(𝑐2−𝑐1)−𝑒[𝑘0+𝑘2+𝜃(𝑘1−𝑘2)]
𝑝+𝑔−𝑣
}.  
So, if 𝑒 >
𝑐2−𝑐1
𝑘1−𝑘2
, then 𝜃𝑒 = 0, 𝑞𝑒 = 𝐹−1 [
𝑝+𝑔−𝑤−𝑐2−𝑒(𝑘0+𝑘2)
𝑝+𝑔−𝑣
] and 𝐸𝑒 = (𝑘0 + 𝑘2)𝑞
𝑒 − 𝐾 
If 𝑒 <
𝑐2−𝑐1
𝑘1−𝑘2
, then 𝜃𝑒 = 1 , 𝑞𝑒 = 𝐹−1 [
𝑝+𝑔−𝑤−𝑐1−𝑒(𝑘0+𝑘1)
𝑝+𝑔−𝑣
]  and 𝐸𝑒 = (𝑘0 + 𝑘1)𝑞
𝑒 − 𝐾 . 
This completes the proof. 
 
The proof of proposition 6 
From proposition 1, we get 𝑞𝑛 = 𝐹−1 (
𝑝+𝑔−𝑤−𝑐1
𝑝+𝑔−𝑣
). 
If 𝑒 >
𝑐2−𝑐1
𝑘1−𝑘2
, from proposition 5, we get 𝑞𝑒 = 𝐹−1 [
𝑝+𝑔−𝑤−𝑐2−𝑒(𝑘0+𝑘2)
𝑝+𝑔−𝑣
]. Considering 𝑐1 <
𝑐2, then 𝑞
𝑒 = 𝐹−1 [
𝑝+𝑔−𝑤−𝑐2−𝑒(𝑘0+𝑘2)
𝑝+𝑔−𝑣
] < 𝐹−1 (
𝑝+𝑔−𝑤−𝑐1
𝑝+𝑔−𝑣
) = 𝑞𝑛 , that is, 𝑞𝑒 < 𝑞𝑛. If 𝑒 <
𝑐2−𝑐1
𝑘1−𝑘2
, from proposition 5, we get 𝑞𝑒 = 𝐹−1 [
𝑝+𝑔−𝑤−𝑐1−𝑒(𝑘0+𝑘1)
𝑝+𝑔−𝑣
] . Then 𝑞𝑒 =
𝐹−1 [
𝑝+𝑔−𝑤−𝑐1−𝑒(𝑘0+𝑘1)
𝑝+𝑔−𝑣
] < 𝐹−1 (
𝑝+𝑔−𝑤−𝑐1
𝑝+𝑔−𝑣
) = 𝑞𝑛, that is, 𝑞𝑒 < 𝑞𝑛. So, 𝑞𝑒 < 𝑞𝑛.  
If 𝑒 >
𝑐2−𝑐1
𝑘1−𝑘2
, then 𝑘𝑒 = 𝑘2 < 𝑘1. Recalling 𝑞
𝑒 < 𝑞𝑛, then (𝑘0 + 𝑘𝑒)𝑞
𝑒 < (𝑘0 + 𝑘1)𝑞
𝑛. If 
𝑒 <
𝑐2−𝑐1
𝑘1−𝑘2
, then 𝑘𝑒 = 𝑘1 . Recalling 𝑞
𝑒 < 𝑞𝑛 , then (𝑘0 + 𝑘𝑒)𝑞
𝑒 < (𝑘0 + 𝑘1)𝑞
𝑛 . So, 
(𝑘0 + 𝑘𝑒)𝑞
𝑒 < (𝑘0 + 𝑘1)𝑞
𝑛. This completes the proof. 
 
The proof of proposition 7 
From (4), we get 𝐸 = [𝑘0 + 𝑘2 + 𝜃(𝑘1 − 𝑘2)]𝑞 − 𝐾 , then 𝐸[𝜋𝑒(𝑞, 𝜃)] = 𝐸[𝜋𝑛(𝑞, 𝜃)] −
𝑒{[𝑘0 + 𝑘2 + 𝜃(𝑘1 − 𝑘2)]𝑞 − 𝐾}. 
If 𝐾 ≤ [𝑘0 + 𝑘2 + 𝜃
𝑒(𝑘1 − 𝑘2)]𝑞
𝑒, we get 𝐸[𝜋𝑒(𝑞
𝑒 , 𝜃𝑒)] = 𝐸[𝜋𝑛(𝑞
𝑒 , 𝜃𝑒)] − 𝑒{[𝑘0 + 𝑘2 +
𝜃𝑒(𝑘1 − 𝑘2)]𝑞
𝑒 − 𝐾} ≤ 𝐸[𝜋𝑛(𝑞
𝑒 , 𝜃𝑒)]. Considering the maximum of 𝐸[𝜋𝑛(𝑞, 𝜃)], we get 
𝐸[𝜋𝑛(𝑞
𝑒 , 𝜃𝑒)] < 𝐸[𝜋𝑛(𝑞
𝑛, 𝜃𝑛)] . Then 𝐸[𝜋𝑒(𝑞
𝑒 , 𝜃𝑒)] ≤ 𝐸[𝜋𝑛(𝑞
𝑒 , 𝜃𝑒)] < 𝐸[𝜋𝑛(𝑞
𝑛, 𝜃𝑛)] , 
that is, 𝜋𝑒(𝑞1
𝑒, 𝑞2
𝑒) < 𝜋𝑛(𝑞1
𝑛, 𝑞2
𝑛) . If 𝐾 ≥ [𝑘0 + 𝑘2 + 𝜃
𝑛(𝑘1 − 𝑘2)]𝑞
𝑛 , considering the 
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maximum of 𝐸[𝜋𝑒(𝑞, 𝜃)] , we get 𝐸[𝜋𝑒(𝑞
𝑒, 𝜃𝑒)] > 𝐸[𝜋𝑛(𝑞
𝑛, 𝜃𝑛)] − 𝑒{[𝑘0 + 𝑘2 +
𝜃𝑛(𝑘1 − 𝑘2)]𝑞
𝑛 − 𝐾} > 𝐸[𝜋𝑛(𝑞
𝑛, 𝜃𝑛)], that is, 𝐸[𝜋𝑒(𝑞
𝑒 , 𝜃𝑒)] > 𝐸[𝜋𝑛(𝑞
𝑛, 𝜃𝑛)]. So, there 
always exist a 𝐾∗ ∈ ([𝑘0 + 𝑘2 + 𝜃
𝑒(𝑘1 − 𝑘2)]𝑞
𝑒, [𝑘0 + 𝑘2 + 𝜃
𝑛(𝑘1 − 𝑘2)]𝑞
𝑛 )  that 
satisfies 𝐸[𝜋𝑒(𝑞
𝑒, 𝜃𝑒)] = 𝐸[𝜋𝑛(𝑞
𝑛, 𝜃𝑛)] , that is, 𝐸[𝜋𝑛(𝑞
𝑒 , 𝜃𝑒)] − 𝑒{[𝑘0 + 𝑘2 + 𝜃
𝑒(𝑘1 −
𝑘2)]𝑞
𝑒 − 𝐾} = 𝐸[𝜋𝑛(𝑞
𝑛, 𝜃𝑛)] , which implies 𝐾∗ = [𝑘0 + 𝑘2 + 𝜃
𝑒(𝑘1 − 𝑘2)]𝑞
𝑒 +
1
𝑒
{𝐸[𝜋𝑛(𝑞
𝑛, 𝜃𝑛)] − 𝐸[𝜋𝑛(𝑞
𝑒 , 𝜃𝑒)]}.  Since 𝐸[𝜋𝑒(𝑞
𝑒 , 𝜃𝑒)] increases in 𝐾, so if 𝐾 > 𝐾∗ , 
then 𝐸[𝜋𝑒(𝑞
𝑒, 𝜃𝑒)] > 𝐸[𝜋𝑛(𝑞
𝑛, 𝜃𝑛)]; if 𝐾 = 𝐾∗, then 𝐸[𝜋𝑒(𝑞
𝑒 , 𝜃𝑒)] = 𝐸[𝜋𝑛(𝑞
𝑛, 𝜃𝑛)]; if 
𝐾 < 𝐾∗, then 𝐸[𝜋𝑒(𝑞
𝑒 , 𝜃𝑒)] < 𝐸[𝜋𝑛(𝑞
𝑛, 𝜃𝑛)]. This completes the proof. 
